More on “relatedness,” Judge Scheindlin and the Second Circuit

I received an e-mail from Katherine A. Macfarlane, Teaching Fellow and Assistant Professor of Professional Practice, LSU Paul M. Hebert Law Center. She has kindly allowed me to reprint it and I do so below. But first, Katherine’s work shows that academic research can materially assist the rest of us. I hope she continues her great work.

The e-mail reads as follow, and note, please, the text that I have highlighted in red:

Dear Judge Kopf,

In light of your recent blog post, I thought you might be interested in my attached article, posted on SSRN in August, and accepted for publication in the Michigan Journal of Race & Law in September. It’s about the SDNY’s related cases rule and its role in stop-and-frisk litigation. Curiously, three of the non-legal sources I cited to–an article by Jeffrey Toobin in the New Yorker, an article by Joe Goldstein in the New York Times, and an article by Mark Hamblett in the New York Law Journal–were also cited by the Second Circuit in its recent order kicking Judge Scheindlin off the stop-and-frisk cases. The “appearance of impartiality” idea also pops up in my article. This is either an incredible coincidence, or else, a clerk read my SSRN post. Either way, I hope you find my article of interest.

The Second Circuit’s decision to reassign the cases makes no sense to me, as Judge Scheindlin merely followed the local rules. As to whether the local rules invite manipulation of the case assignment process is an entirely different question that my article attempts to tackle.

Best regards,

Katherine A. Macfarlane
Teaching Fellow and Assistant Professor of Professional Practice
LSU Paul M. Hebert Law Center

RGK

A cheap shot

Yesterday, I asked: What do you think about the Second Circuit’s removal of Judge Shira Scheindlin? Today, I will provide the short version of my views.

As I have said before, federal trial judges know their place. We are the TTT of the federal judiciary. When the Circuit tells us to jump, we do so even if we don’t much like it. But, in return, we expect only one thing: no cheap shots.

The Second Circuit’s spontaneous decision, apparently without briefing and coming out of the blue, was factually predicated upon a “relatedness” question mentioned in the record before the Court of Appeals and in the footnoted NYT article referred to by the Circuit. But, if that was really the reason for the trial judge’s removal, the decision was both wrong, and, worse, unnecessary.

Judge Scheindlin was holding a hearing where the plaintiffs sought to reopen a case. The judge thought the case could not properly be reopened, but a new case could be filed as a “related case.” She said so on the record. The NYT article mentioned the judge’s statement. Apparently, the case that the judge suggested be “related” when filed is one of the cases before the Circuit. The Second Circuit thought the judge’s statement reflected a lack of impartiality.

The reason we have relatedness rules in the district courts is to avoid treating similar cases dissimilarly and because it wastes judicial resources by duplicating effort when two judges deal with similar issues.  The failure to enforce relatedness rules can cause a huge problem for the lawyers, the trial judge and the appeals court. The fact that Scheindlin told the lawyers that they could file a “related” case is exactly what I would have done. Indeed, I have done something similar in an extraordinarily high-profile case.

I authored both “partial birth abortion” decisions ultimately decided by Supreme Court. Dr. LeRoy Carhart brought both cases. In the second case, dealing with the federal statute, my chambers was notified by Dr. Carhart’s lawyers in advance that they would be filing suit and seeking an immediate emergency temporary restraining order the moment the President signed the bill. In turn, my chambers notified the United States Attorney’s office that suit would soon be filed and an emergency hearing would take place quickly thereafter.

I was then Chief Judge, and I instructed the Clerk to treat any such new case “as related” to the first Carhart case. That the cases were “related,” as Dr. Carhart’s lawyers later indicated when they filed the second suit, was simply not debatable. Indeed, the federal statute purported to expressly rebut my earlier factual findings. But, here’s the pertinent point for this discussion:

I affirmatively acted to intervene in the random assignment of cases, for among other reasons, because our local rule required enforcement and because requiring a new judge to take the nearly identical second abortion case would have unnecessarily burdened that judge who would have had to “reinvent the wheel” with little or no time to get up to speed. By then, I knew more about gynaecology than any man, who is not a doctor, has any right to know. Simply put, trial judges should be concerned with “relatedness”–for Christ’s sake, it’s our job.

Let me give you another example. I now have a very high-profile case–actually a series of cases that have now been consolidated. They became terribly screwed up because the lawyers did not initially “relate” them and the Clerk’s office failed to catch the problem. Those omissions resulted in conflicting decisions by my colleague and me on the same facts regarding qualified immunity as it pertained to the same defendants. Both went up to the Circuit at the same time as separate cases. Crazy! Costly! Wasteful! Inconsistent! Unnecessary! Embarrassing!

So, the Second Circuit’s removal of Judge Scheindlin because she told the parties to “relate” cases is dubious at best. Actually, I was going to write that it was “bullshit,” but decided against that description.

What then is going on? The Second Circuit judges are excellent judges and I am sure they are sincere in their concern. But the reason they have given for their unprecedented action is laughable. Something else must be going on. We are all left to speculate what the real reason might be. What is worse, we are confronted with the unhappy result that the appellate judges themselves are now open to the assertion (wholly rejected by me) that it is they who have a political or policy agenda.

And the startling thing is that this whole damn thing was unnecessary. The appellate judges could have granted the stay, and in the stay order provided that the trial judge “shall take no action inconsistent with the stay in this case or in any related cases.” That would have preserved the status quo while avoiding the unnecessary criticism of the trial judge.

If the appellate judges were worried about the judge’s impartiality, they could have called for a full exploration of that matter at a later date. At the very least, following a more regular process would have shielded the appellate judges from the assertion that they were acting as political hacks rather than impartial appellate judges unconcerned with whose ox was being gored. Frankly, this whole debacle is just mystifying to me.

Let me sum up. Unintentionally I am sure, the panel of highly regarded and very smart judges on the Second Circuit that too hastily disqualified Judge Scheindlin, herself a highly respected trial judge, fractured the unwritten but critical social compact between federal trial judges and federal appellate judges that should bind those judges together as they seek to fulfill a common purpose. In short, “eating your young” is not a good way to foster collegiality.

RGK

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